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NOTES

Oil Pollution Liability and Control
Under International Maritime Law:
Market Incentives as an Alternative to
Government Regulation

ABSTRACT

Oil spills on the world's oceans and waterways are a
significant environmental threats. This Note explores some of
the myriad reasons why the law-in both the United States and
the internationalcommunity-has failed adequately to address
many of the reasons spills occur in the first instance.
Beginning with a brief history of various pollution control
schemes enacted over the past few years, this Note focuses on
why the current international legal regimes remain ineffective
in combating oil pollution. In essence, this Note argues that the
current laws fail because of textual deficiencies, a failure to
address the external economic realities of the shipping industry,
and a basic misconception that ex ante punishment of multibillion-dollar corporatepolluters is more effective than ex post
pollution control via market-based control mechanisms.
This Note argues that the solution to oil pollution control
rests in enacting market-based laws that allow for the free
trading of pollution trading permits, such as those used with
some success in the U.S. Clean Air Act amendments. Building
on the writings of Ronald Coase, Lisa Heinzerling, and others,
this Note argues that the application of law and economics
methodology to oil pollution liability and control will yield more
favorable results than the existing command-and-control
structuralparadigm.
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And learn 0 voyager to walk
The roll of earth, the pitch and fall
That swings across these trees those stars:
That swings the sunlight up the wall.
And learn upon these narrow beds
To sleep in spite of sea, in spite
Of sound the rushing planet makes:
And learn to sleep against this ground.'

I. INTRODUCTION

Oil pollution from spillage and other accidents aboard
transporting ships remain a significant threats to world oceans and

1.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, Seafarer, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY

1064 (Alexander W. Allison et al. eds., 1975).
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waterways. Since the vast majority of oil transported on the world's
oceans is shipped via tanker, transporting vessels are a major target
of pollution-preventing legislation. At the end of the 20th century, the
world's tanker fleet consisted of 6,739 vessels, most of which boasted
cargo capacities between 76,000 and 175,000 tons. 2 The international
community has responded to the threat of oil spills posed by these
huge vessels by passing several "super statutes," namely the Civil
Liability Convention of 1969, coupled with the complementary 1992
international protocols, 3 (collectively, CLCs), applicable to over 90
international states, 4 and the Oil Pollution Act of 19905 (OPA) in the
United States.
Unfortunately, the existing statutory regimes have only served
to create vast government bureaucracies, whose only true function is
punishing polluters after spills have occurred. 6 Administration of the
CLCs and OPA "wastes tens of billions of dollars every year,
misdirects resources, stifles innovation, and spawns massive and
often counterproductive litigation. '7 The after-the-fact system of fines
and punitive measures created by the CLCs and OPA has not
prevented the amount of oil spilled in the world's oceans during the
last twenty-five years because it fails to address the market-based
reality of the oil transport industry. Oil transporters will continue to
pollute as long as they can afford the after-the-fact fines imposed by
governments, provided the market does not exact a financial toll vis;i-vis factors such as decreased market capitalization and shareholder
dissatisfaction.8 Although fines serve as a marginal deterrent, they do
nothing to remedy the serious environmental damage caused by large
oil spills. 9 A system focusing on pre-pollution prevention, with the
market-rather than government-as the chief regulatory force,

2.
See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 96 (2000).
3.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 1992, reprinted in 6A BENEDICT ON
ADMIRALTY, Doc. 6-4B.

4.
The international oil pollution liability regime consists in the aggregate of
five separate parts: the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage of 1969, the Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage of 1992, the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage of 1992, the
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea of 1996, and the
International Convention on Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage of 2001.
5.
33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
6.
See id. (creating vast statutory framework, punishing polluters ex post the
polluting events, rather than punishing ex ante pollution).
7.
See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1333 (1985).
8.
See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
9.
See id.
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would create a more effective and efficient liability scheme for oil
pollution prevention and control.
Although both the CLCs and the OPA have their merits, neither
contains liability provisions that have been consistently effective in
preventing oil pollution or holding polluters accountable for damage
to the environment. This Note will explore some of the reasons for
this failure, while proposing an alternative regime for combating the
oil pollution problem.' 0
Part II addresses the history of oil pollution control and liability
under international law, going back to the beginning of oil transport
on the high seas. Part III discusses the CLCs and OPA, focusing first
on practical problems with the statutes themselves in failing to create
an effective liability regime. Part IV next focuses on the overall
inadequacy of nation-state environmental regulation via the existing
statutory regimes. Finally, Part V will discuss various market
incentives, such as deregulation and route trading, as viable
alternatives to super statutes.
This Note will argue that a permit trading scheme involving
routes or launching and landing berths would provide a superior
model for environmental regulation of oil spills than the current
command and control structures imposed by the CLCs and OPA by
promoting economic efficiency. Such a system would require
governments to fix a set amount of oil that could be spilled within a
certain timeframe. Working cooperatively, national governments
would fix a total amount of oil that could be spilled per year and issue
permits that would allow their holders to transport oil. Unlike
command and control systems of pollution control, which assume that
the implementation of Best Available Technology (BAT) on the part of
individual transporters will somehow reduce overall pollution levels
to an acceptable level," a permit system will allow governments,
environmentalists, and the market to adjust (and re-adjust) the total
level of ambient pollution desired-and monitor compliance via pre12
pollution permit trading, as opposed to post-pollution fines.

10.
Though some may argue that the CLCs and OPA are ineffective because
liability caps for polluters are too low and also because-especially in the case of the
CLCs-no single forum is made available for the adjudication of claims. However, even
if legislative bodies were able to solve these problems through deliberation and more
careful drafting, the CLCs and OPA remain fatally flawed because they fail to
recognize that shipping regulation simply does not respond to traditional "command
and control" legislation. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.

11.
12.

See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2701.
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7410, for an example of how ambient

pollution standards have been enacted in the context of ambient air pollution control.
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HISTORY OF OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY AND CONTROL UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Both European countries and the United States enacted oil
pollution regulations in the 1800s. After the TORREY CANYON spill
in 1969, which was, at that time, the worst oil spill in world history,
several nations resolved to enact an international liability regime for
oil spills. Although the United States participated in the convention
producing the CLC of 1969, it declined to join, citing inadequate
damage liability caps. 13 Only much later, in 1990, did the United
States enacted its own liability scheme, the OPA of 1990, for oil spills.
The OPA ironically has also been criticized for its inadequate damage
caps. 14 Although the caps exceed those of the CLCs, it remains clear
that large-scale transporters can evade legal liability for major
15
spills.
A. Pre-1960s Oil Pollution Control
The United Kingdom became the first nation to enact water
pollution legislation in 1814.16 The United States followed in 1866
with the Refuse Act, prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into New
York Harbor. 17 In 1899, the prohibition was expanded to include all
18
navigable waters.
Advancing technology and greater energy needs incited an
explosion of world demand for oil during the first half of the 20th
century. 19 In 1924, the United States passed the Oil Pollution Act of

13.
It should also be noted that concerns about federalism played a significant
part in United States reluctance to adopt any of the CLCs' implementing protocols.
Ratification would have pre-empted state liability laws in Oregon, Washington, Alaska,
and any other state imposing liability above the federal limits. Damon L. Vickers,
Deterrence or Prevention-Two Means of Environmental Protection: An Analysis of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Oregon Senate Bill 242, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 405, 41012 (1992).
14.
See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
15.
As of Jan. 25, 2003, for example, Exxon Mobil remains the largest
transporter of oil on world oceans. Ironically, the OPA-which was passed in response
to the Exxon Valdez spill-would have been ineffective in holding Exxon legally
accountable for cleaning up the latter because its damage caps are too low. However,
with a market capitalization approaching $200 billion, Exxon faces tremendous
political pressure to clean up oil spills, even if no liability exists under any legal
regime.
16.
Jaclyn A. Zimmermann, Note, Inadequaciesof the Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
Why the U.S. Should Adopt the Convention on Civil Liability, 23 FORDHAM INVL L.J.
1499, 1502 (2000).
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.; see JOANNA BURGER, OIL SPILLS 19 (1997).
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1924, making it illegal to dump oil into U.S. coastal waters. 20 In 1948,
this was followed by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and,
later, in 1966, by the first statutes attempting to address possible
21
maritime environmental damage.
B. The TORREY CANYON Spill and the Civil Liability Convention of
1969
On March 18, 1967, the oil supertanker TORREY CANYON
grounded off the southwest coast of England, dumping 120,000 tons
of heavy crude oil onto approximately 100 miles of the British and
French coastlines. 22 This disaster created unprecedented public
interest and concern about the dangers of oil pollution from accidents
aboard transporting ships and served as the impetus for passing the
Comprehensive Liability Convention of 1969.23 Although the vast
majority of seafaring nations adopted the CLCs, the United States
24
refused to adopt the convention.
The CLCs imposed strict liability on all ship owners transporting
oil, 25 created a compulsory liability insurance requirement on ship
owners, 26 and implemented a supplemental liability fund, IOPC, to
which oil transporters must contribute. 27 After a spill, injured parties
first attempt to recover damages by making claims under the CLCs; if
amounts specified therein are inadequate, the IOPC is available to
28
supplement their damage claims.
According to commentators in the United States, the liability
caps under the CLCs continue to be inadequate to prevent major oil
spills. 29 Under Article III of the Comprehensive Liability Convention
of 1969, a ship owner can never be liable for more than a predetermined amount, based on the size of his vessel.3 0 Even the
expansion of the maximum liability limits to $169 million under the
CLC's 1992 protocols was not sufficient to convince the United States
31
to join the international community.

20.
Zimmermann, supra note 15, at 1502.
21.
Id.
22.
Browne Lewis, It's Been 4380 Days and Counting Since Exxon Valdez: Is It
Time to Change the Oil PollutionAct of 1990?, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 101 (2001).
23.
Zimmermann, supranote 16, at 1507.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 1509.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 1510; see International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971,
reprinted at 11 I.L.M. 284 (1972); with protocol, Nov. 19, 1976, reprinted at 16 I.L.M.
617 (1977).
28.
Id.
29.
Zimmermann, supranote 16, at 1510.
30.
Id. at 1512, 1516.
31.
Id. at 1513, 1519.
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In March 2001, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
passed a new International Convention on Liability for Bunker Oil
Pollution damage, presumably to supplement and fill liability gaps
left by the CLCs. 32 Prior to the enactment of the Bunkers
Convention, ships carrying oil intended to be used for the operation or
propulsion of the ship were not liable for causing pollution damage by
spilling it. 33 This represented a significant gap since roughly half of
all oil spills in international waters are bunker oil spills. 34 Under
both the Bunkers Convention and the CLCs, ship owners are strictly
liable for pollution damage caused by bunker oil spilled from their
ships. 35 Unfortunately, liability limits under the Convention are
36
undefined; national governments are left to set their own limits.
Adding to this confusion, the Bunkers Convention fails to track the
CLCs in assigning liability for spills: under the latter, one person can
be held liable for damages and clean-up, while the former contains
provisions that hold several parties liable. 37 So, while the new
Bunkers Convention attempts to fill gaps in the CLCs, it may simply
superimpose an additional layer of confusion upon an already
muddled liability scheme.
C. United States Response to the Need for Oil Pollution Control
Although the United States did not believe that the CLCs'
liability caps were adequate to deter polluters, the U.S. Congress still
realized that some sort of liability framework was needed. 38 Congress'
first attempt to address this need was the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1970 (FWPCA).39 This act declared a national policy
prohibiting oil discharges and imposing civil penalties and strict
liability for clean-up costs. 40 Under the FWPCA, responsible parties
included owners, operators, or any onshore or offshore facility from
which oil was discharged into or upon the navigable waters of the
United States, the adjoining shorelines, or the waters of the
contiguous zone. 41 From an environmental perspective, the FWPCA's
major weakness was that private parties could not recover damages
or clean-up costs caused by an oil spill from a vessel. 42 Private parties

See generally Chao Wu, Liability and Compensation for Bunker Pollution,
32.
33 J. MA. L. & COMM. 553 (2002).
See id. at 556.
33.
See id. at 555.
34.
35.
See id. at 557.
36.
Id. at 561.
37.
Id. at 558.
38.
See Zimmermann, supra note 16.
39.
Lewis, supranote 22, at 108-09.
40.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
41.
Id. § 1321(f)(1), (f)(2).
Lewis, supranote 22, at 103.
42.
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were instead required to rely on maritime tort principles to recoup
their losses. 43 In other words, private parties could make no recovery
for damages from polluters unless they could prove culpable
negligence. 44 This was a far cry from the strict liability standard set
out by the CLCs.
The passage of CERCLA in 1980 did not solve the problem.
CERCLA was intended to create a broad liability scheme for damages
caused by the release of hazardous substances into the
environment. 45 The term "environment" included the navigable
waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and ocean waters under U.S.
jurisdiction. 46 However, the term "hazardous substance" specifically
47
excluded oil and petroleum products.
Not until the EXXON VALDEZ disaster in March 1989, did
Congress pass comprehensive oil spill liability legislation. 4 8 After
striking a shoal on the sea bottom, the VALDEZ spilled 11 million
gallons of crude oil and dispersed oil over 1,300 miles of the Alaska
coastline. 49 The spill energized the public to spur Congress to passafter fifteen years of deliberation-a comprehensive statutory scheme
addressing oil spills. 50 It has been suggested that although the OPA
was passed in response to a specific incident, it probably would not
have prevented that incident had it been in effect at the time. 5 1
The OPA's provisions dealing with liability differ markedly from
those of the CLCs. Title I of the Act neither pre-empts conflicting
state law nor adopts the international protocols. 5 2 The OPA expands
the liability and limitation programs of prior laws and addresses
particular aspects of prevention, removal, and civil penalty
programs. 53 Like the CLCs, the OPA created a supplemental fund to
be used as compensation for losses not covered by polluters. 54 Unlike
the CLCs, Congress did not cap liability, deciding instead to permit
states to impose liability in addition to the federal liability, 55 though
many states have failed to impose additional liability on oil

43.
44.

45.
46.
47.

Id.

Id.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
Id. § 9601(8).
Id. §§ 9601(8), (14).

48.
Lewis, supranote 22, at 108-09.
49.
Zimmermann, supra note 16, at 1527. For a comprehensive account of the
EXXON VALDEZ spill, see CONRAD SMITH, MEDIA AND APOCALYPSE: NEWS COVERAGE
OF THE YELLOWSTONE FOREST FIRES, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, AND LOMA PRIETA
EARTHQUAKE 77-114 (1992).

50.
51.

Zimmermann, supra note 16, at 1528.
See Bradley C. Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control

Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 TEX. L. REV. 711, 725-34 (1995).

52.
53.
54.
55.

Lewis, supranote 22, at 109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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transporters. 56 Finally, the OPA limits liability exclusively to the
owner, operator, or charterer of the polluting ship.5 7 Again, unlike the
CPC, oil companies who own the ship's cargo escape liability under
the OPA, creating an escape valve for major oil companies who are
able to divest themselves of their shipping operations. 58
D. Latest Developments
In November 2002, the tanker PRESTIGE broke in two and sank
off the coast of Spain. 59 Its cargo was several hundred thousand tons
of heavy industrial fuel oil for use in power plants. 60 Less than two
months later, the Turkish tanker VICKY collided with a sunken
carrier off the coast of France, spilling 70,000 tons of highly
flammable kerosene. 61 These accidents prompted the European
Commission to propose additional legislation strengthening maritime
safety, and underscore the deficiencies of the CLCs' liability scheme.
The European Union proposed a prohibition on the transport of heavy
fuels in single-hulled tankers in EU waters, in addition to a phase-out
plan for existing single-hulled tankers. 62 Such legislation would
supplement the CLCs and bring EU law in line with similar
provisions in the OPA.
These accidents have also prompted groups such as the World
Wildlife Federation (WWF) to call for strict regulations concerning
the condition of ships and the operation of shipping lanes. 63 WWF has
asserted the need for regulating ship design, maintenance, and
shipping routes. 64 Although the new legislation proposed by the EU
will address some of the WWF's concerns with ship design and
maintenance, it does nothing to address where ships are allowed to
travel. 65 The OPA has a similar legislative void. Even if one assumes
that single hull bans and forced phase-outs of older ships have a

56.
For one possible explanation, see supra note 13 and accompanying text; see
also Vickers, supra note 13, for a discussion of the possible conflicts between the OPA's
liability provisions and those imposed by the State of Oregon.
57.
OPA § 1001(32); 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
58.
See International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, 59.
59.
BNA, Daily Environment Report, Jan. 6, 2003, available at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/den.nsf/is/aOa6g9j9f6 (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
60.
Id.

61.

BNA,

Daily

Environment Report,

Jan.

9,

2003,

available at

http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/ied.nsf/is/AOA6H2U6D8 (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
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significant impact on spill reduction, 66 these provisions cannot be
67
effective in their aims until shipping routes are controlled.
This Note will argue that shipping routes and port berths should
be freely tradable in the marketplace. Functionally, this would be
similar to the methodologies employed by the U.S. government in
auctioning radio spectrum frequencies and selling landing slots to the
major airlines. 68 Such a scheme could potentially achieve greater
pollution control with significantly reduced transaction costs.

III. THE CLCs'

AND OPA's LIABILITY SCHEMES REMAIN INEFFECTIVE IN
COMBATING OIL POLLUTION

Despite claims to the contrary, both the CLC and OPA have
failed to prevent oil pollution and to compensate victims of that
pollution, as evidenced by the recent spills of the PRESTIGE and
VICKY. 6 9 Every year, thousands of oil spills are reported in U.S. and
international waters. 70 From 1973 to 1984, the United States
experienced between 9,000 and 12,000 oil spills per year. 71 During
that period, the total amount of oil released into the U.S. marine
environment from oil spills ranged from a low of 8.2 million gallons in
1977 to a high of 21.5 million gallons in 1975.72 According to statistics
maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard, there have been no spills of over
one million gallons since 1990; however, the largest oil spill in the
United States since 1996 occurred on November 28, 2000, when the
WESTCHESTER spilled over 538,000 gallons of crude into the
73
Mississippi River.
Although the volume of oil spilled in U.S. waters dropped by 70
percent, from 9.7 gallons per million spilled in 1990 to 2.7 gallons per
million in 1999, it is unclear whether this decline is because of the
internal pressures of the OPA's sanctions, or simply because external
market pressures have forced developments such as equipment

66.
This contention is controversial. The major objections against double hull
construction include: (1) The potential for explosion because of gases trapped between
the hulls; (2) the need for special emissions devices; (3) the possibility of water filling
the space between the ruptured outer hull and the inner hull, causing the potential for
increased spillage; and (4) the increased construction expense in relation to the risks
incurred. Vickers, supra note 13, at 417-18.
67.
BNA, supra note 61.
68.
See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
69.
See Lewis, supra note 22, at 98; see also Spillage Data available at
http://www.assembly.coe.int/Documents[WorkingDocs/docO3/EDOC9684.htm.
70.
Lewis, supra note 22, at 98.
71.
Id.
72.
Id. at 99.
73.
Id.; see discussion infra note 75.
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74
upgrades, better spill-avoidance technology, and more skilled crews.

Additionally, it must be noted that, although the total volume of oil
spilled in U.S. waters declined during the 1990s, the number of major
oil spills by tankers in international waters actually increased from
ten between 1967 and 1989 to thirty between 1990 and 2000,
indicating perhaps that large transporters of oil remain undeterred
75
by the existing statutory regimes.
A. InternalProblems with the CLCs and OPA
Although there are multiple reasons why the CLCs and OPA
have been ineffective in their lofty aims, two major problems with the
structure of the laws that highlight why they have not had a greater
impact on pollution control. First, liability limits under both regimes
are too low to discourage major oil producers and transporters from
taking all possible precautions to prevent spills. Second, neither
regime provides a single forum for adjudicating damage claims. This
leads to problems with conflicting laws, forum shopping, and other
related enforcement problems.
The liability caps imposed by the CLCs and OPA are inadequate.
As stated previously, the CLCs' liability provisions are limited. 76 The
maximum liability under the 1992 Protocols is $196 million.7 7 In
contrast, the maximum liability under OPA is $350 million. 78 Under
the CLCs, liability is strict and is limited no matter what the cause of
the spill.79 Under OPA, the responsible party cannot limit its liability

if the oil spill was proximately caused by the gross negligence or
willful misconduct of the party, its agent, employee, or person acting
pursuant to a contract with a responsible party.80 In addition, if the
oil spill is caused because one of those parties violated a federal
safety, construction, or operation regulation, the responsible party
cannot limit its liability under the statute.8 ' Finally, the OPA does

74.
BNA, Daily Environment Report, Jan. 10, 2003, available at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/den.nsf/is/aOa6h3z5a9 (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
75.
See The Mariner Group, Oil Spill History, at http://www.marinergroup.com/
oil-spill-history.htm (last visited July 23, 2003). Notably, the worst oil spill in United
States history since the EXXON VALDEZ occurred on November 28, 2000, when the
WESTCHESTER spilled over 538,000 gallons of crude oil into the Mississippi River,
closing a busy shipping route for 26 miles and threatening pelicans, shorebirds,
seabirds, crabs, shrimp, sport fish, and over 100,000 wintering waterfowl. Id.; see supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
76.
Zimmermann, supra note 16, at 1512.
77.
Id. at 1513.
78.
33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(4) (2003). Notably, the EXXON VALDEZ remediation
has cost over $2 billion to date, an amount that far exceeds the liability imposed by
both the CLCs and the OPA. See infra, note 84 and accompanying text.
79.
Zimmermann, supra note 16, at 1512.
80.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(A).
81.
See id. § 2704(c)(1)(B).
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not limit or pre-empt state laws which may impose additional
82
liability.
Neither of the liability schemes embraced by the CLCs or the
OPA is sufficient in terms of providing punitive economic incentives
to avoid oil pollution. Exxon Mobil, for example, made $191 billion in
gross profits in 2002.83 Even at its most onerous, the OPA's liability
scheme would fail to impact that profit margin significantly,
suggesting that the law fails to create sufficient pecuniary incentives
for large transporters to avoid spills. Simple arithmetic suggests that,
from a purely economic perspective, Exxon Mobil could annually
safely absorb several disasters comparable in size to EXXON
VALDEZ and still remain profitable.8 4 The liability schemes
embraced by the CLCs and OPA are little more than a minor
economic concern for major oil producers.8 5 Exxon, for example, spent
over $2 billion to clean up the Prince William Sound area after the
VALDEZ spill-an amount far exceeding its OPA liability-and that
area still has not completely recovered from the adverse effects of the
spill.8 6 This suggests that economic liability alone would not be
sufficient to compel Exxon to continue its remediation efforts in the
effected area.8 7 Instead, market and political concerns would likely
play a more powerful part in creating incentives for pollution control
than would the current super statutes' regulatory regimes, which are
based on insufficient attempts at economically punitive-style
88
damages.
Additionally, neither the CLCs nor the OPA provide by itself an
answer to the question of jurisdiction over claims. The CLCs' attempt
to preempt any nation's contrary laws regarding oil pollution by
preempting national laws and superseding all other international
conventions.8 9 The 1992 Protocols expand the geographic range of the

82.
See id. § 2718(a)(2) (2003); Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d
623, 630-31 (1st Cir. 1994).
83.
See financial data for Exxon Mobil, available at http://uk.biz.yahoo.com/p/x/
xom.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). For statutory liability caps on oil spill damages,
see 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1).

84.
Assuming Exxon's clean-up costs reach as much as $3 billion, its overall
profits (even if all clean-up costs were absorbed in a single fiscal year) for any given
year would be reduced by less than 2 percent, based on profits from the most recent
fiscal year. See supra, note 83; infra, note 86 and accompanying text.
85.
See Bobertz, supra note 51, at 732 ("Without the threat of statutory
liability, oil companies that previously shipped their own cargo might discontinue that
practice and divest themselves of their shipping interests, draining the funds available
for safety measures... ").
86.
Lewis, supra note 22, at 127-28.
87.
See id.
88.
See Bobertz, supra note 51, at 733 ("[Exxon's] efforts to save wildlife and to
spray and wipe oily beaches probably had as much to do with restoring its tarred public
image as they did with restoring the ecological integrity of Prince William Sound.").
89.
See CLC, 973 U.N.T.S., supra note 3, art. XII.
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CLCs from the territorial sea of a member nation to the exclusive
economic zone of a member nation. 90 By expanding the scope into this
ethereal netherworld, the CLCs purport to expand the grounds for
recovery. If a vessel spills oil into CLCs' waters, then CLCs'
provisions apply, regardless of whether the ship owner is a citizen of
a member nation.91 The major difficulty here is that CLCs' provisions
do not apply to the vessels of member nations outside of CLCs'
waters. 92 Therefore, if a spill occurs in a non-CLCs state's territorial
waters, such as the United States, the CLCs provisions do not
apply. 93 Finally, CLCs judgments will not necessarily be enforceable
94
if a ship owner travels to a non-CLCs jurisdiction to escape liability.
The OPA fails for different reasons. The OPA does not preempt
state oil pollution laws or specify a single forum for the adjudication
of claims. 9 5 Because conflicting state statutes pose different liability
schemes on each other (and in relation to the OPA), the party
responsible for the spill will be unable to predict the possible outcome
of his case. 96 Although Congress's stated goal was to create a
comprehensive and predictable liability scheme, it has instead added
to the confusion because multiple schemes, leading to forum shopping
and lack of judicial economy because judges have less experience97
and thus are unable to gain expertise-in dealing with OPA claims.
Because Congress chose neither to adopt the CLCs nor to preempt state laws, the United States has no set means for establishing
jurisdiction over foreign ship owners who spill oil in U.S. territorial
waters. 98 States face little hope of compelling foreign ship owners to
comply with their own liability statutes. 99 Even if jurisdiction can be
obtained, state judicial systems face significant barriers, such as
delay and litigation expenses. 100 Finally, unlimited liability
statutes-as imposed by state legislatures-are unlikely to be insured
against by underwriters. 10 1

90.
Id.; see also Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supranote 3, art. 3.
91.
Zimmermann, supra note 16, at 1514.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
See id. at 1538.
95.
Lewis, supra note 22, at 127.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Vickers, supra note 13, at 421.
99.
Id. Problems faced by United States states include difficulties establishing
jurisdiction over foreign parties and administrative expenses.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
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B. External Problems Circumvent Meaningful CLCs and OPA
Revisions
Simon Cripps, director of WWF's endangered seas program, has
stated that
Three main factors affecting the risk of shipping disasters are the
design of ships, the maintenance of ships and the controls on where
ships can go. If you get one of these things wrong, you can have a
disaster on your hands. It seems that in the case of the PRESTIGE, all
10 2
three factors had a role in what went wrong."

In the OPA, Congress attempted to address design and maintenance
issues by gradually phasing out older tankers and requiring that new
tankers and retrofits be insulated with double, instead of single,
hulls.1 0 3 The OPA calls for the phaseout of all single-hull tankers by
2010 unless they get retrofitted with double bottoms or sides, in
which case they can operate until 2015.104 The CLCs contain no such
requirement, although EU nations have determined, based on the
recent PRESTIGE and VICKY spills, that the implementation of a
double-hull requirement would be desirable. 10 5
Although a full analysis of whether or not the implementation of
double hulls has itself significantly reduced oil pollution is beyond the
scope of this Note, it does bear mentioning that the topic is
controversial. 10 6 In a Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee hearing on January 9, 2003, Paul Pluta, Coast Guard
commandant for marine safety, security, and environmental
protection, admitted that he did not know whether a single factor
such as the double-hull requirement was responsible for the decline
in oil spills during the last several several years.10 7 Probably, he
admitted, the spill was due to a combination of factors.10 8
Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to analyze each factor
contributing to the decline in oil spills separately, it is likewise
difficult to analyze why-or whether-the OPA and CLCs have by
themselves improved the quality of the environment on the high seas.
It is important to realize that new technologies, including electronic
navigational charts from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, have played a role in greater maritime safety and
awareness. 10 9 Heightened safety concerns following the EXXON

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

BNA, supra note 59.
OPA, 33 U.S.C. at § 4115.
BNA, supra note 74.
BNA, supra note 61.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
BNA, supra note 74.
Id.
Id.
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VALDEZ accident probably also have led to greater employee training
110
and awareness.
Finally, neither of the legal regimes imposed by the OPA and
CLCs say anything about where ships can travel. Tankers can travel
through and spill oil and petroleum products in waters previously
designated as Potentially Sensitive Shipping Areas (PSSAs). n '
Although the laws of a particular country may impose fines or other
penalties on such behavior, the after-the-fact punishment is often
inadequate in that it does nothing to repair any potentially
irreparable damage that has been done to the environment. As
experience has shown, the damage done in major oil spills cannot
112
often be easily undone.
Perhaps the major failing of both the CLCs and the OPA is that
they are "grounded in the notion that fear of penalty will deter vessel
and facility owners and operators from engaging in undesirable
activities."' 1 3 The liability provisions of both acts are not triggered
until spills actually pollute the ocean; thus, the laws are toothless
until the very behavior they seek to deter-environmental damagehas been done, often at irreversible levels.' 14 Unless one assumes
that economic sanctions alone are sufficient to deter polluters-a
rather dubious assumption-then we must realize that after-the-fact
115
fines cannot and will not compel polluters to change their behavior.

IV. FAILURE OF THE PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL IN CONTEXT OF CLCs AND

OPA
Although a full discussion of the fallacies of public choice theory
as applied to environmental law is beyond the scope of this Note,
suffice it to say it is an important area in the context of oil pollution
prevention. 1 6 As Richard Revesz has noted, "The dominant view in

110.
See generally Thomas A. Birkland, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez: How
Environmental Disasters Influence Policy, Environment (Sept. 1998), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf dls/ml076/n7_v40/21058620/pnnt.jhtml (last visited
Nov. 12, 2003) (suggesting that greater operational efficiency was a by-product of the
EXXON VALDEZ spill).
111.
BNA, supra note 59. A Potentially Sensitive Shipping Area (PSSA) has
been defined by the IMO as an area within the shipping lanes that is particularly
susceptible to environmental damage, due mainly to sensitive populations of marine
life.
112.
See SMITH, supra note 49.
113.
Vickers, supra note 13, at 431.
114.
See id.
115.
See supra Part III.A and accompanying notes.
116.
For an overview of important work in the academy dealing with the
application of Public Choice ideology to federal government regulation, see generally

Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
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the legal academy on the allocation of responsibility for
environmental regulation favors federal regulation on the ground
that public choice pathologies cause environmental interests to be
systematically underrepresented at the state level relative to
business interests."'117 However, he goes on to explain why there are
severe problems with8 the public choice assumption in the context of
11
environmental law.
The most common claim by public choice theorists seems to rest
on the assumption that, the federal government is a better
environmental regulator than individual states because the latter are
unduly susceptible to the pressures of interest groups hoping to gain
lax pollution control standards. 119 If a particular industry group, such
as a large oil company, hopes to obtain less stringent regulation, it
will simply locate its operations in a state bent on mollifying this
particular company, or attracting its business away from another
state with more stringent pollution control laws. 120 The difficulty is
that many scholars advocating this view fail to explain why these
problems would be solved by federal regulation. 12 1 Indeed, several
states, counties,
and municipalities have adopted various
environmental statutes that go far above and beyond the pollution
1 22
control mandated by federal law.
The creation of the CLCs and the OPA followed a model
advocated by public choice theorists for decades, namely, that federal
regulation of the environment is inherently good. 123 The failure of the
CLCs and OPA to achieve an acceptable measure of oil pollution
control
should
call
these
assumptions
into
question.
Environmentalists and governments should perhaps re-focus their
efforts toward creating market-based and, by necessity, smaller scale
goals. As decentralization of environmental regulation is increasingly
becoming a political reality, it is necessary to consider alternative
approaches for meeting protectivist environmental goals. 124 Because
the current centralized approach to oil pollution regulation based on

PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 5-65 (1971); GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA
OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY 41-48
(1993); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1998); Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in

Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 60 (1992); Christopher H. Schroeder,
Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment-Explanations for Environmental Laws,
1969-73, DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 553, 566 (1997); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM
T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR (1981).
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119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Revesz, supra note 116, at 555-56.
See id. at 557.
Id. at 559.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 585.
Revesz, supra note 116, at 557.
See id. at 557-58.
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super statutes has not been completely successful, and since the
current regime is increasingly unlikely to succeed in today's legal and
political climate, perhaps it is time to explore various market-based
125
incentive systems, such as a pollution permit trading program.

V. MARKET INCENTIVES AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO "SUPER
STATUTES"

As indicated previously, the current legal and political climate of
environmental deregulation on an international scale makes it
increasingly unlikely that super statutes like the CLCs and OPA will
remain in favor. 126 Inherent problems with the underlying theory of
environmental regulation are creating fallacies and causing
lawmakers to overlook other possible solutions. 127 This section will
deal with the possibility that the free market itself may be a viable
source of environmental regulation in the oil pollution context.
"Pollution trading" became fashionable in the 1990s as a way to
promote efficiency and democracy, and to lower the costs associated
with traditional command and control environmental regulation. 128 In
trading, the government markets permits that allow firms to pollute
the environment. 129 The most popular use of this system is arguably
the emissions trading program enacted by Congress during the
Clinton Administration.1 3 0 First, the government decided on a
permissible pollution level, after which permits were issued
accordingly. A firm wishing to exceed the ambient air emissions
standard set by the government had the choice of either adopting
rigorous technology standards or simply purchasing an offset-a right
to pollute-contained in one of the aforementioned permits.
Trading differs from command and control regulation in terms of
its enforcement emphasis:
In a command and control system, the government dictates the
technology that must be installed to control pollution; it need not make
a precise decision about the total amount of pollution that it will allow.
The decision regarding the level of pollution is an implicit one: to allow
that amount of pollution which remains after all relevant firms have
installed the requisite technology. In contrast, to create a pollution

125.

For some ideas about how to do this, see infra Part V and accompanying

notes.

126.
See supra Part III and accompanying notes.
127.
See supra Part IV and accompanying notes.
128.
Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 300, 301 (1995); see Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 7, at 1341-51; Richard B.
Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 153, 158-62 (1988).
129.
See generally Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 7.
130.
See generally id.
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trading system, the government must first explicitly decide how much
13 1
pollution to permit.

From the standpoint of promoting efficiency, the adoption of a similar
trading system by international seafaring nations could have a
positive impact on the world's oceans by allowing the market to
allocate responsibility for oil pollution control on a cost-for-use
basis. 132 The creation of a market-based permit trading system,
similar to that created under the Clean Air Act amendments, would
be one way of accomplishing a market-based system of oil pollution
regulation. 133 Rather than focusing on clean-up and remediation after
a spill occurs, a system of permit trading would encourage oil
transporters to implement appropriate pollution control technologies
to prevent spills from occurring in the first place. This proactive
market-based approach would focus on consumers and the
environment, rather than on the administrative bottleneck imposed
by command and control legislation.
A. Law and Economics in an Environmental Context
The economic rationale for market-based pollution control is
based on the concept that pollution itself is an economic problem that
can be solved through conventional market mechanisms. 134 The
"standard economic account," according to Lisa Heinzerling, suggests
that firms will not spend money to protect the environment because
"collective goods," such as air and water, are shared in common by all
people. 135 By investing money to keep the environment clean, firms
benefit free-riding individuals other than their customers, hence the
latter are unwilling to pay the full cost of benefits because they do not
accrue for their sole benefit. 136 "'Collective goods' often lead to
'externalities': the environmental consequences of unregulated
market transactions are not reflected in price, and as such, these
consequences, and their effects on others, are not taken into account
in market behavior." 137
A.C. Pigou first suggested a solution to the problem of
138
externalities by proposing a tax on externality-producing activities.
The tax would permit the external costs of the goods to be
internalized upon consumption.1 39 In the context of environmental

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Heinzerling, supra note 128, at 302.
See infra Part V.A-B and accompanying notes.
See id.
Heinzerling, supra note 128, at 305.
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Id.; A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 129-30 (1960).
PIGOU, supra note 137, at 129-30.
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law, the government would have to identify all of the various
environmental impacts of a given activity, and then place a price tag,
or tax, on that activity. 140 In theory, the tax would compensate for the
collective goods discrepancy reflected in the market since all
consumers would be forced to bear the full social cost of their
behavior via this tax. 14 1 By equating the private cost of a polluting
the market to
activity with its social cost, the tax would enable
142
goods.
collective
of
allocation
optimal
the
achieve
Ronald Coase and others have criticized Pigou for ignoring the
interchangeable nature of harms involved, and for creating a system
in which it is objectively impossible to determine the proper amount
of "tax" to be assessed to polluters. 143 Coase argued that in balancing
the rights of a group of citizens to clean air against the right of a
factory to pollute, one must balance the harm caused by the factory's
polluting activity against the citizens' harm to the factory's
activities. 144 This balancing of economic interests suggests that
rational individuals will bargain amongst themselves for the most
efficient allocation of resources; the Pigouian "tax" becomes
145
superfluous.
Coasean theory is of particular relevance to the context of oil
pollution prevention. 146 Coase theorized that, where there are no
transaction costs and where there is perfect information, rational
individuals will bargain to reach an efficient allocation of resources,
regardless of whether it is the polluter or the polluted who receives
the initial entitlement. 14 7 Similarly, oil companies, ship owners, and
other potential oil polluters have a vested interest in acting rationally
to prevent pollution. As rational economic actors, responsible parties,
given the proper incentives and lack of onerous government
regulation, will choose to act responsibly in preventing pollution,
simply because pollution reduction will be a more efficient means of
achieving the end goal of profitability. 148 In the context of air
pollution emissions trading, studies have shown that permit trading
programs reduce pollution at a lower cost than do command and
control regimes, largely because firms are able to choose whatever
means of compliance is most cost-effective for them: firms may either
employ reasonable pollution-control technology or, if this is too

140.
141.
142.
143.
1 (1960).
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.

Id.
See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON.
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expensive, buy permits from other firms. 149 In the oil pollution control
context, such a system would be preferable to the current command
and control regime because it would permit oil transporting firms
with low compliance costs to overcomply and sell their permits to
firms with higher compliance costs, thus ensuring the lowest cost,
most efficient means of achieving the desired water pollution level. 150
As several scholars have suggested, the government could simply
adopt a two-step policy in the area of social risks and social harms, as
applied to environmental law. 151 Because people and firms would be
able to purchase freely tradable permits to pollute, those who reduced
their pollution below the threshold level would be able to trade their
so-called pollution rights for cash from firms who were unable to do
the same.15 2 As Professor Sunstein writes:
In one bold stroke, such a system would create market-based
disincentives to pollute and market-based incentives for pollution
control. Such a system would also reward rather than punish
technological innovation in pollution control, and do so with the aid of
private markets. Very generally, and quite outside the environmental
area, it makes sense to think about programs of this sort for regulation
153
of harmful behavior.

In the context of oil companies, transporters would purchase
permits very similar to those issued to firms under the Clean Air Act
amendments. First, individual governments, either of the United
States or international nation-states, would determine an
environmental standard specifying the total number of gallons per
year that could be spilled in the world's oceans without incurring the
need for monetary compensation or remediation. 154 Each government
then could establish a pool of permits and allocate them to relevant
oil transporting firms.' 5 5 Every firm would be required to hold these
permits to account for potential spills occurring during the transport
of oil, but they would be allowed to freely buy, sell, and trade the
permits amongst themselves; those most able to create and
implement pollution control technology would be able to sell their
56
permits to those who have less ability and financial resources.'

149.
See, e.g., R. Andrew Muller & Stewart Mestelman, Emission Trading With
Shares and Coupons:A Laboratory Experiment, 15 ENERGY J. 185 (1994).
150.
See Heinzerling, supra note 128, at 308. See generally J.H. DALES,
POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968).

151.
See Cass R. Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 949, 964-66 (1991). See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming EnvironmentalLaw: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
152.
See Sunstein, supra note 151, at 965.
153.
Id.
154
Cf. Heinzerling, supra note 128, at 301 (discussing similar scheme in
context of Clean Air Act amendments).
155.
Cf. id.
156.
Cf. id.

MARKET INVENTORY FOR OIL POLLUTION CONTROL

20041

285

Each government would retain overall control over the process by
by issuing a set
specifying how much pollution could occur, and
15 7
determination.
its
to
according
permits
of
number
In searching for other appropriate analogies to shipping, it is
compelling to examine regulated industries in the United States, such
158
The reason underlying
as airlines and communications airwaves.
regulation of these particular industries is, in both fact and purpose,
similar to the reason international shipping could be effectively
regulated: an abundance of access to the resource leads to a tragedy
of the commons: too many self-interested firms and individuals acting
for themselves in detriment to the common environment. As Garret
Hardin described:
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture
open to all .. .As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize
his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks,
'What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?' This
utility has one negative component and one positive component.
1.

The positive component is a function of the increment of one
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale
of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.

2.

The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing
created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of
overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for
any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of-1.

Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add
another animal to the herd. And another; and another.. .But this is the
conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that
compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each

Cf. id.
157.
One potential problem with the proposal in this Note concerns how
158.
governing bodies would police the quantity of oil spilled on the open sea by purchasers
of "pollution permits." Presumably, oil pollution must be visible in order to be
specifically tracked by a regulating body. Since any potential polluter would suffer a
reduction in profits due to an obligation to purchase offsetting pollution permits, there
would be a strong incentive to underreport oil pollution that is not visible to outside
observers. If such "chiseling" could be detected easily, then potential polluters would
have a powerful legal incentive to comply with the law. Here, however, it is very likely
that the cost of proving liability for non-compliance with a permit would be very costly.
In this case, the problem must become part of the solution: the regulator must contract
to control the standard of pollution by building in the costs of monitoring or bonding
arrangements into the cost of the permit itself. Since visibility would be both costly to
monitor, and a source of exploitation for polluters, an acceptable range of pollution
permitted seems more viable in practice than setting specific "drop-dead" pollution
targets. For an informative analogy, see discussion of so-called "best efforts"
contractual provisions in CHARLES J. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS 354-57 (1984); see
also infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom
15 9
of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

The fear of totally unregulated radio waves is based on this very
premise-that the resource itself could be destroyed by overuse. 160 In
radio broadcasting, the perceived threat is that, like the ocean, there
is a finite amount of available airspace for the transmission of radio
waves. 161 Theoretically, a totally deregulated radio broadcasting
industry would eventually pollute the limited bandwidths available
with static and interference. 1 62 To guard against this possibility, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) created a system of
allocating and distributing radio frequencies in blocks, and
monitoring the airwaves via classic command and control
mechanisms. 163 But Thomas P. Hazlett writes that traditional
property law provides a more effective regulatory mechanism than
bare command and control regulation:
Private owners spontaneously assess consumer benefits in nuanced
profit calculations (trading costs against revenues), while regulators
tend to make categorical decisions. [Federal regulators use] an
economically crude and technically obsolete framework to separate
various services in frequency space . . . [T]he system is clearly inept at
maximizing consumer welfare, as vast portions of spectrum space are
left vacant and virtually all the remaining portions are
underutilized ... [Government interference by means of] public interest
allocation historically has been based on the claim that radio spectrum
is a unique resource that cannot be regulated by standard means such
as property rights. Not only is this proposition theoretically false ....
but it is operationally incorrect, as radio spectrum users under public
interest regulation rely on de facto private property rights to limit
interference. Market forces constrain private parties to respect lines
16 4
drawn by regulators.

Although it is tempting to think of command and control
regulation as being mandated by the scarcity of a particular resource,
i.e. the airwaves, the truth is that-like the airline and shipping
industries-the abundance and ease of access to those airwaves are
factors making government command and control regulation
extremely inefficient in practice. 165 Ronald Coase succinctly described
the problem with using scarcity as a factor justifying regulation in his

159.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
160.
Cf. id. (demonstrating that destruction of the pasture necessarily follows
overgrazing).
161.
Cf. id.
162.
Cf. id.
163.
See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth
Myth, the Spectrum Allocation Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big
Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001).
164.
Id. at 373-74.
165.
See id. at 484.
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critique of Justice Felix Frankfurter's Supreme Court opinion in NBC
166
v. United States:
[T]hese arguments ...are based on a misunderstanding of the nature
of the problem. Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to think that federal
regulation is needed because radio frequencies are limited in number
and people want to use more of them than are available. But it is a
commonplace of economics that almost all resources in the economic
system (and not simply radio and television frequencies) are limited in
amount and scarce, in that people would like to use more than
exists ....It is true that some mechanism has to be employed to decide

who, out of many claimants, should be allowed to use the scarce
resource. But the way this is usually done in the American economic
system is to employ the price mechanism, and this allocates resources
167
to users without the need for government regulation.

Professor Hazlett observes, "Instead of regulation being
mandated by a peculiar form of scarcity, open access to spectrum is
mandated by a peculiar form of abundance. It is inefficient . . .to
promote property rights [in the spectrum]. Technology dictates that
spectrum should be kept open to all.' 168 This follows Coase's belief
that resources should be allocated according to market forces rather
than government decisions, chiefly because of two major hurdles the
government faces: first, the lack of precise monetary measures of cost
and benefit provided by the market; and second, the fact that it
cannot possess all relevant information possessed by the managers of
each and every business which uses or might use the resource, to say
nothing of consumer preferences for various goods and services which
169
might flow from that resource.
The spectrum allocation system consists of a resource, much like
the world's oceans, that cannot be owned by any party.' 70 When
governments attempt to regulate access to either, they are attempting
to police the resource for the benefit of its citizens. As a result, a
tragedy of the commons emerges: citizens are, at least, the nominal
"owners" of both the spectrum and the seas; however, they are
individually detached from the management of their "property,"
leading to a tremendous waste of their tax dollars, and of the
resources themselves, by the government. 171 Effective control of the
resource belongs to whatever special interest group has been
successful in tilting government decision-makers toward their
cause. 172 Hazlett suggests that, instead of subjecting resources to
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administrative scrutiny by means of a command and control legal
regime, rules should be made that "encourage innovation and
173
competitive entry" into the market.
Beginning in 1993, Congress permitted the FCC to auction radio
licenses on a competitive basis, creating this type of "competitive
entry." 174 The policy, Hazlett continues, has resulted in the creation
of important efficiencies, three of which are directly applicable in the
oil transportation context: first, reduced rent-seeking behavior;
second, reduced delays in the administrative process; third, more
efficient "taxation."'1 75 A permit trading program giving oil
transporters a tradable right to dock at particular ports, combined
with liability for the route traveled to that port, would have a similar
effect by reducing the race to transport oil from point A to point B at
all costs, including the failure to take the proper safety precautions to
prevent environmental damage. 176 Additionally, it would demystify
the process for pursuing environmental damage claims in court,
because the owner of a permit would be responsible for any damage
caused on route to its permitted docking destination; liability would
be strict and not open to the uncertainties of multiple jurisdictions
and conflicting laws. 177 Finally, the buying and selling of "docking
permits" would be a more efficient means of raising revenue to
combat current and future environmental problems than would the
current methodology of charging fines to remediate spills that have
178
already occurred.
Eli Noam has proposed that, like airline routes in the sky,
airwaves should be freely shared with no exclusive rights. 179 Since
jetliner routes are non-scarce goods, new unobstructed routes may be
freely claimed: planes avoid other planes, for obvious reasons.1 80 It is
only where competing claims arise, such as the right to take off and
land, that the need to create a property interest comes about.' 8 ' In
the United States, rights to take off and landing slots at major
airports have been well established and freely tradable for many
years.'8 2 Noam proposes that airwave access rights should not be
auctioned to high bidders who are purchasing "control over a specific
slice of the rainbow. 18 3
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So, if the current command and control structures do not work in
terms of the case studies mentioned-airlines, communications, and
oil transportation-then what should replace it? The clear choice
made by the scholars cited here seems to be that a property right that
favors consumers would be far superior to the current legal regimes
imposed because rights
promote
economic efficiency
and
simultaneously discourage rent-seeking behavior.18 4 Richard Posner
writes that laws promoting economic efficiency are a powerful force
driving the law: "The efficiency theory of the common law is not that
every common law doctrine and decision is efficient .... The theory is

that the common law is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for
18 5
maximizing the wealth of society."'
In the context of oil transportation, the creation of a marketable
permit trading system would promote greater efficiency in oil
transport and lower economic and environmental costs associated
with spills.' 8 6 Risks would be undertaken by the transporters, with
the understanding that spill liability and remediation would be their
own responsibility.1 8 7 Significantly, profit calculations by firms would
include the opportunity costs of potential spills.' 88 Third party agents,
such as insurers, would indemnify firms against potential liability
only after taking reasonable steps to ensure environmental safety and
compliance.18 9 "Efficient mitigation" by oil transporters would lower
the cost of insurance coverage and simultaneously improve the
technology used to reduce oil spills. 190
Although the analogy between airwave rights, airlines, and oil
transporters seems obvious, it is worth mentioning at least one
counterpoint to the argument for creating a marketable property
right for oil transporters. George Gilder writes: "You can no more
lease electromagnetic waves than you can lease ocean waves .... You

can use the spectrum as much as you want as long as you don't collide
with anyone else or pollute it with high powered noise or other
nuisances." 191 Again, the similarity between the spectrum, air, and
ocean seems rather easy to grasp; here, Gilder merely parrots the
well-worn truism that one cannot regulate anything that one cannot
completely control. 192 Given the relative success of tradable take-off
and landing slots in the airline industry, it seems obvious that the
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property rights that are regulated and traded-and to which value is
assigned in the market-are those that can be completely
193
controlled.
Like radio waves and airline traffic, oil tankers must effectively
manage their business within a common-pool resource. 194 The
abundance of the resource in question-the ocean-may serve to
create an artificial sense of security until an oil spill occurs. Unlike
the herdsman's pasture in Hardin's tragedy of the commons, the
ocean can most likely be used by seafarers without depleting the
resource itself; however, there can be severe incidental consequences
to the misuse of the resource. 195 For this reason, it makes much sense
to follow the examples provided by the communications and airline
industries in the United States and create some sort of marketable
trading system, wherein routes, and landing and launch berths at
major international ports are auctioned to the highest bidder. Ronald
Coase would likely agree with the premise that a pricing system
allowing free trade of the ocean's resources would prompt the most
efficient economic outcome by providing the highest and best users a
19 6
property right via the free market.
B. Possible Solutions: Using Economics as a Springboardfor Legal
Reform
Accepting Coase's normative premise, as rational economic
actors, responsible (i.e. potentially polluting) parties must be given
197
economic incentives to act responsibly in preventing oil pollution.
This may happen in several ways, all of which involve removing
current market constraints. A pure economic analysis would suggest
removing all barriers by completely deregulating oil pollution
control. 198 Although this is unlikely to succeed for numerous
practical, legal, and political reasons, it can be used as a baseline for
suggesting solutions to the problem of oil pollution. The chief problem
with total deregulation is that the ocean is ultimately a finite
resource that has a symbiotic relationship with most-if not all-

193.
See Noam, supranote 179, at 765, 770.
194.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
195.
See id.
196.
See generally Ronald H. Coase, Comment on Thomas W. Hazlett: Assigning
Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67
Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 577 (1998).
197.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
198.
See id. This is not to suggest that a Coasean world is one in which total
economic "deregulation" would be favored as a means of avoiding problems with
externalities. Rather, this Note uses the concept of deregulation broadly to encompass
the notion of reinventing government by changing existing control paradigms rather
than totally removing them.

20041

MARKET INVENTORYFOR OIL POLLUTION CONTROL

291

living things on the earth. 199 The main difficulty with total
deregulation is that the incentives for pollution will outweigh the
incentives not to pollute, for reasons discussed above. 200 But is the
present regulatory system really a better solution than deregulation?
The current regime imposed by the CLCs and OPA "wastes tens of
billions of dollars every year, misdirects resources, stifles innovation,
and spawns massive and often counterproductive litigation. ''20 1 On
the other hand, it seems almost Panglossian to argue that a world of
totally unregulated pollution would be optimal simply because cleanup would involve enormous transaction costs. 20 2 Another possibility
to consider is the fact that the market itself and the desire for greater
profits could serve to incentivize pollution-controlling behavior on the
part of responsible parties.20 3 Simple competition may force
20 4
companies to reduce oil pollution, at least to a point.
Tax impositions for pollution control and the development of new
pollution-controlling technology may be one alternative to total
deregulation. 20 5 This would be a form of "payment" to be made by
potentially responsible parties that would serve to incentivize
pollution control. 20 6 Taxes have been effective in other contexts for
encouraging responsible behavior; this would simply be an extension
of that paradigm. 20 7 The difficulty with pollution taxes is that they
run headlong into the classic Pigouian dilemma: How does one place
an objective price tag on pollution? For example: Imagine that we
wanted to determine the appropriate amount of tax to charge for, say,
1,000 gallons of oil spilled per year. We know that oil spilled in the
ocean has an adverse effect on marine life by directly poisoning fish
and birds, and by preventing certain species of plankton from
receiving air and light from the water's surface. Additionally, we
know that oil sullies the beaches and may have both direct and
indirect effects on human and animal life on land adjacent to the
polluted water. Assuming we can determine how much 1,000 gallons
of oil contributes to each specific harm mentioned above, we still
would have to place a monetary valuation on that harm. Overall, the
208
market cannot provide us with answers to these questions.
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One may, however, be able to implement a tax based on a predetermined pollution standard. William Baumol and Wallace Oates
designed a tax based on reducing pollution below a certain threshold
level, pre-determined via established political processes. 20 9 Given the
uncertainty of environmental impacts and costs, the goal that their
tax would achieve would be somewhat "arbitrary. '2 10 Given that fact,
they advised that the tax be imposed only on pollutants that met
three conditions: 1) they must cause severe harm; 2) the harm can be
controlled at reasonable cost; and 3) the harm decreases as the
pollutants' level decreases. 2 11 Theoretically, then, the benefits of their
212
system would roughly approximate their costs.
At first blush, it seems that this proposal would not work well in
the context of oil pollution prevention for two reasons. First, the
pecuniary damage from major spills can reach into hundreds of
millions, and sometimes, billions of dollars-hardly a "reasonable
cost" by any measure; and second, the environmental harm caused by
oil pollution damage does not necessarily decrease as the oil is
abated. 213 In the Prince William Sound area, Exxon has spent $2
billion and counting to remediate the damage from the EXXON
VALDEZ spill, and the environmental impacts have, very likely, not
214
been completely assessed or appreciated to date.
A better alternative seems to be the marketable emissions
permit trading system proposed by J. H. Dales. 215 Under Dales's
proposal, the government would administer pollution permits that
reflect an aggregate pollution limit set by the government, which
firms could freely buy, sell, and trade. 216 This system, he argued,
would be superior to Baumol and Oates's tax because the permits
would directly enforce the government's pollution limit through the
number of permits issued, rather than indirectly enforcing a nebulous
tax based on compliance costs. 2 17 Dales's proposal comes very close to
218
the system implemented by the Clean Air Act amendments.
The most important qualification to be made in the context of oil
pollution is that the total amount of savings from a hypothetical
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permit trading program is largely dependent upon many factors, such
as the type of pollutant being regulated, the extent of existing
pollution control technology available, and the level of pollution
control currently deemed practicable and desirable. 219 Additionally,
administrative and initial implementation costs of any potential
program could fatally outweigh any potential benefits. 220 In terms of
oil pollution, the ocean itself is a vast resource that would present
many inherent administrative difficulties in implementing a viable
permit program. Governments would have to delineate clear
boundaries and territorial areas over vast distances, and then set
standards for the maximum pollution permitted over these distances.
Rather than thinking of the ocean as a series of roads, analogous to
overland travel, it may be more feasible to control the frequency of
docking at particular ports, as well as creating standards for pollution
at and near those ports. 221 In this way, an oil pollution permit trading
system would resemble both the Clean Air Act emissions trading
scheme, and the current regulatory structure imposed by the United
222
States government on the airline and communications industries.
The solution for oil pollution control that most closely resembles
both Dales's proposal and the current air pollution permit program
under the Clean Air Act amendments would be a mandatory permit
trading program, adopted and administered by the governments of
individual nations. 223 Essentially, oil and petroleum transporters
would purchase permits to use specific ports for the loading and
transportation of cargo, gaining perhaps an exclusive right to use
that port for a particular period, similar to current airline and
communications regulation. 224 Along with the privilege of using the
port would come the responsibility for any spills that occur, either in
port or on route. In essence, transporters would be purchasing a
freely tradable property right A la Dales, which could be regulated by
both external (market) and internal (legal) forces. 225 Under this
regime, governments could limit the type of ship, or the cargo being
carried, within a Particularly Sensitive Shipping Area (PSSA), or any
other area subject to environmental damage. 226 It is generally
accepted today in regulatory contexts that "resources are most likely
to receive the appropriate level of conservation" when "they are
protected by well-defined property rights" because resources that are
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jointly owned tend to be overused, resulting later in a lack of
227
investment.
Water quality trading in the United States is not a new concept.
In May 2002, the EPA published a proposed Water Quality Trading
Policy, which would offer incentives to states, Indian tribes, and
companies to comply with the requirements of the Clean Water
Act. 228 In a water quality trade, one polluter reduces its discharges
below the regulatory level and, in exchange, receives a "credit" that
can be sold to another polluter that cannot afford the same level of
pollutant reduction. 229 Most water quality trading programs consist
of: pollutant baselines and reduction goals, a statement of eligible
pollutants and polluters, the definition of geographic boundaries, and
various systems and processes to ensure effective administration,
230
enforcement, and tracking of pollutant trades.
Naturally, some difficulties would crop up in an oil pollution
trading system modeled after the "typical" water quality trading
programs under the U.S. Clean Water Act. 231 First, decisions would
have to be made by international lawmaking bodies concerning the
definition of acceptable pollutant data quality and quantity
standards. 232 Perhaps this would necessitate the creation of a
specialized administrative tribunal of experts, who would be
appointed by their respective nation-states in conjunction with
previously agreed-upon standards. 233 Second, there would be
significant cost restrictions, based on the need to administer such a
program, set pollution baselines, negotiate and document permit
trades, and conduct pollution monitoring via consistent water quality
tests. 234 Since major oil transporters are the primary beneficiaries of
this plan, perhaps it would make sense to require them to bear some
of the administrative costs.
Whatever the preferred method of attainment, it is clear from an
economic standpoint that a loosening of the regulatory noose would
create a more efficient system of oil pollution control. It is widely
accepted that government planning and intervention generally lead
to an inefficient allocation of resources and spawn rent-seeking
behavior on the part of various interested parties. 235 Additionally,
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there is strong evidence in some sectors that this inefficiency hinders
236
the development of new technology.
Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart have argued that some
market-based regulatory measures have the effect of requiring public
debate in the context of creating overall pollution limits. 237 One of the
consequences of this debate may be to require governments to assess
their coastlines to identify environmentally sensitive areas as PSSAs.
Although the International Maritime Organization (IMO) set out in
1992 to identify these PSSAs, only five have been created, including
the Great Barrier Reef in Australia. 238 PSSAs are supposed to receive
special protection through action of the IMO for their ecological,
cultural, or scientific significance, and their vulnerability to damage
from shipping activities, but the IMO has only limited capability to
police violations. 239 Although the CLCs, in theory, should create a
liability scheme for oil polluters who damage PSSAs, they contain no
240
specific provisions to that effect.
Many scholars would argue that command and control
legislation often fails to eradicate environmental problems such as
this because the very structure of the regulatory scheme prevents
them from having this impact; the emphasis is not on efficiency of
outcomes, but on retaining control of the process itself.24 1 Aside from
merely creating efficient economic outcomes, then, permit trading
may provide a forum for resolving sensitive or complicated public
242
debates about the environment.
Notably, the process of deregulation promoted in this Note would
serve the democratic process well by encouraging debate about the
proper pollution standards. In the permit process outlined above,
world governments would issue permits that would be traded in the
open market; however, prior to the issuance of such permits,
governments would have to determine what levels of oil pollution in
the oceans were acceptable. 24 3 Such determinations would not be
possible without an involved and engaged electorate. 244 The system
proposed would not simply remove the government from the decisionmaking process, it would simply involve the latter at a different stage
245
of the game.
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Finally, I offer a few words about the enforcement of my
proposed market-based regulatory plan. In writing about the
inadequacies of the current airwave spectrum allocation policy,
Thomas Hazlett suggests that perhaps the FCC should be replaced by
a Spectrum Court that would govern all spectrum disputes based on a
broad statutory declaration that "all non-interfering entry [to the
spectrum] is lawful and that private property rights to radio waves
may be registered with the Spectrum Court. '246 In theory, this court
would have a special expertise in spectrum matters, and would
resolve controversies based on standard market protections of
property, contract, and antitrust law. 24 7 Such a system would work
well in the oil transportation regime proposed in this Note. After
permits are purchased and sold by transporters, the market and the
248
common law would serve to protect and enforce their rights.
Governments of the world would be compelled to work together to
establish a cooperative judicial body to administer disputes. Unlike
the CLCs and the OPA, there would be internal consistency in such
an arrangement. Very likely, the greater economic efficiency of
market permit trading would be accompanied by increased judicial
efficiency, leading to more predictable outcomes in disputes and a
greater chance for achieving just results.

VI. CONCLUSION
It remains highly doubtful that the OPA and CLCs have by
themselves reduced the amount of oil spilled by tankers into the
world's oceans. 24 9 This is partially due to statutory defects in the laws
themselves, but also because of serious problems with the underlying
reasoning that created those laws. As the air emissions trading
program has demonstrated, market forces and economic incentives
will have as great as, or greater, an effect on controlling oil pollution
than the existing command and control statutory schemes by
promoting efficiency and rational economic action. 250 Drawing this
conclusion requires making the assumption that a carrier
transporting oil on the high seas is analogous to a factory emitting
sulphur dioxide, at least in the sense that the pollution level can be
predicted and controlled. 25 1 Additionally, one must assume that the
model of selling airwave access rights or airline landing slots is
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25 2
sufficiently analogous to shipping to provide a useful model.
Although both analogies are far from perfect, they do provide a
baseline set of economic assumptions for modeling a solution to the
very serious problem of oil pollution control and prevention in
international waters.
Although both U.S. and foreign governments have taken steps to
regulate oil spills and impose liability on polluters via super statutes,
lawmakers and courts have consistently admitted that state and
federal regulation may not be adequate to prevent environmental
damage caused by oil spills.253 In United States v. Locke, for example,
Justice Kennedy conceded that, given the tremendous mass of oil
transported by tankers, the oil's proximity to marine life, and the
destructive power of oil itself, "international, federal, and state
regulation may be insufficient protection," if a spill occurs. 254 Since
the political branches of government appear more interested in
perpetuating themselves and shifting the focus of this problem onto
one another, we cannot assume that the current command and
control regime will accomplish anything beyond maintaining the
current status quo. On the other hand, oil transporters, concerned
with economic factors as well as the satisfaction of consumers, are
simply better situated to manage pollution control via market
mechanisms. Freely tradable permits, issued by the government
based on its determination of acceptable pollution levels, would allow
oil transporting firms the freedom and incentive to 1) create better
pollution control technology and pollution preventive measures; 2)
police their own behavior via market mechanisms; and 3) avoid the
rent-seeking behavior that inevitably accompanies command and
255
control regimes.
The prevention of oil spills will remain a serious issue as long as
tankers continue to be used on the open sea. Although the demand for
tankers is down, largely because pipelines are used to transport
petroleum products, the world's tanker fleet remains the chief source
for transporting oil and petroleum products. 256 As long as there are
ships transporting oil over the seas, humankind shall need an
effective and efficient way to regulate their activities. The system of
permit trading proposed in this Note is not perfect, and its
implementation would be subject to numerous administrative and
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political challenges. However, the system proposed here would, in
theory, prevent pollution of the world's oceans by encouraging
efficiency and technological innovation, as opposed to the inefficiency
of the current system's after-pollution payment regime. My hope is to
influence the political process; to suggest a fresh approach to a
problem in great need of a new perspective.
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